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 China. One of the most important directions of foreign policy of the CAR is 
development of relations with China, the general border with which makes 3300 km. 
In foreign policy of China 4 basic development principles of China`s relations with 
the countries of CAR are formulated. They are the following: the principle of peaceful 
neighborliness; respect of the right for an independent choice of a social system, val-
uable concepts and ways of development; development of mutually beneficial trade 
and economic cooperation; assistance of regional stability, respect of the sovereignty 
and independence of other countries. These principles were formulated during the 
visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to Tashkent in 1994.
 In the early 90s in the in Central Asia policy China considered the following 
priority problems:
• Solution of boundary problems;
• Restriction of Pan – Turkism influence, ethnic separatism and the politized Is-
lam on The Xinjiang region;
• Expansion of trade and economic contacts with the states of CAR for the purpose 
of preservation of the political and economic presence;
• Preservation of political forces balance in the region;
• Restriction of presence of the USA in the region.
 China was one of the first foreign countries to declare about recognition 
of the states of CAR, having established diplomatic relations with them (with Uz-
bekistan – since January 2, 1992, with Kazakhstan – since January 3, 1992, with 
Tajikistan – since January 4, 1992, with Kyrgyzstan – since January 5, 1992, with 
Turkmenistan – since January 6, 1992).
 In foreign policy of China concerning the CAR there are strategic interests, 
which are accumulated in the sphere of strengthening of regional security, and also 
in political, economic and scientific and technical areas.
 One of problems for the China leadership is the sphere of safety. China con-
siders preservation of tranquility on borders of the country and its internal stability 
as the important directions in the relations with the countries of the region. The 
Kazakh political scientist U. Kassenov said: „Threat of territorial integrity of Kaza-
khstan is potentially possible from Russia and China … However it is only hypotheti-
cal threat as neither Russia, nor China put forward territorial claims to Kazakhstan, 
and there are no bases to believe that they will nominate them in the near future” [1].
 The needs of China for oil and gas resources increase every day and in the 
agenda the idea of „a variety of energy import” takes the essential place. The Chi-
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nese scientists consider that the CAR will become a potential source of oil and gas, 
because oil and gas pipelines from this region are shorter and safe, than alternative 
routes.
 In the strategic relation the alliance with China is capable to provide stra-
tegic bases of global control of the American pressure. As Z. Bzhezinsky supposes, 
Central Asia is the continent which is capable in a perspective to throw down a chal-
lenge to power of the USA and which control will provide strategic superiority of the 
USA in the world in a long term perspective [2, page 89].
 In general, China, as well as Russia, is not interested in strengthening of 
the USA in the CAR. At the same time, China, using strategic rapprochement and 
partnership with the countries of CAR, can have advantages in the foreign policy as 
opposed to Japan and India that will weaken their pressure upon regional policy in 
the Pacific Rim.
 Strategic interests of China in the CAR mainly concern problems of safety 
and economic cooperation. Besides, in fight against religious extremism, the inter-
national terrorism and national separatism the Central Asia republics and China 
have common goals. In this regard it is necessary to use diplomatic potential and to 
make efforts for development of cooperation in these spheres.
 The Chinese government is against fight of powers and the different political 
organizations in the CAR. China notes that such powers as the USA, the EU, Russia, 
Iran, Turkey, India, etc. impose the values and models of development to the CAR 
that causes instability in society. Fight for energy resources conducts to cut-throat 
competition and as the result stability in the region is broken. Besides, some coun-
tries extend Muslim extremism here that also causes social and national instability.
Kazakhstan and China have the general border 1730 km long. In the northwest re-
gion of China, border with Kazakhstan, about 1,5 million ethnic Kazakhs and about 
8 million Turkic people live that makes Peking reck on with a geopolitical role of 
Astana in order to avoid emergence of the separatism centers in the territory. Such 
danger has been for a long time and is connected with activity of the National Lib-
eration Uyghur Movement „Great Turkestan” which supports independence of The 
Xinjiang region Uyghur Autonomous Region of China.
 Overpopulation of China, limitation of natural resources volume of which 
will not correspond to rates of economic growth very soon, huge army and tradi-
tionally great influence of military elite – all this can cause a strong temptation to 
encroach on territorial integrity of Kazakhstan at low fighting capacity of the Kaza-
khstan army and economic crises in the country.
 From the economic point of view, it is favorable to Kazakhstan to have close 
trade and economic relations with China, getting access to dynamically developing 
markets of Southeast Asia. China, in turn, is interested in transit opportunities of 
Kazakhstan in the area of the Old Silk Way, and also natural resources. According to 
forecasts of the Chinese National Oil and Gas Corporation, by 2010need of China for 
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oil will make 260 million tons, and deficiency – 70 million. Therefore, about 30% of 
the consumed oil will be imported.
 Such position of affairs will promote that Kazakhstan will become one of 
sources of oil receipts to China. Kazakhstan and China have already signed the 
Agreement on construction of a gas and oil pipeline from the Western Kazakhstan to 
the northwest provinces of China. Thereby Kazakhstan has received one of alterna-
tive routes for transportation of the strategic resources that is very important for the 
state which does not have other accesses to foreign markets except transit through 
Russia. Moreover, the Agreement with China showed to Russia and the USA that 
they are not the only large players in Kazakhstan. From the point of view of strategic 
expediency, Kazakhstan conducts active contacts with Russia, the USA and China, 
keeping balance of interests. As the Border Agreement between the two states signed 
in 1994is the base for the Kazakhstan-Chinese relations, and also the safety guaran-
tee given by China to Kazakhstan in 1995 [3]. 
 Most of analysts are convinced that in spite of the fact that the countries of 
Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, are included in „a traditional sphere of influ-
ence” of China, the last has no imperial aspirations here. The fact that China is the 
most multi - populated power of the world; and has the nuclear weapon and also 
historical claims for the territories which are nowadays a part of Kazakhstan, turn 
the relations with China into the most important problem of external safety.
 One more important aspect of a problem of national security of Kazakhstan 
is that the Republic borders on The Xinjiang region Uyghur Autonomous Region in 
which Uyghurs and also 1, 5 million Kazakhs live. Separatist sentiments among the 
Chinese and Kazakhstan Uyghurs and relationship of related communities of two 
countries are capable to make serious impact on safety of the country.
 Diplomatic relations between two countries were established on January 3, 
1992. Strategic setting of the Kazakhstan management consisted in providing such 
character of the relations with China which would facilitate the solution of a two-
uniform task: ensuring national security of Kazakhstan and strengthening of inde-
pendence. Kazakhstan` s geopolitical conditions do not leave any other alternative 
of ensuring own safety, except maintenance of balance in the relations with Russia 
and China. It means that character of the bilateral Kazakhstan-Chinese relations has 
to satisfy both parties, and at the same time should not bring any special troubles to 
Russia.
 During N. Nazarbayev’s visit to China in October, 1993 the Declaration on 
Bases of Friendship between Kazakhstan and China was signed. The document de-
clared commitment of two countries to the principles of neighborliness, respect of 
the sovereignty, non-aggression and non-interference to internal affairs of each oth-
er. As well the Declaration fixed the consent of China of guarantees not to use the 
nuclear weapon against Kazakhstan [4].
Regional Players in the Central Asian Region...
420
 In February, 1995 the People’s Republic of China provided nuclear guar-
antees to Kazakhstan. The Chinese party made such a statement,“China with full 
understanding treats desire of Kazakhstan to obtain safety guarantees. Uncondition-
ally to abstain from use of the nuclear weapon or threat of its application against the 
non-nuclear states and denuclearized zones is a consecutive position of the Chinese 
government …”
 Nuclear tests which China carried out on the ground Lop Nor, near border 
with Kazakhstan, caused natural concern of the government of Kazakhstan. These 
tests complicated great medical and environmental problems for the population of 
the region. This problem in the relations between two countries was removed when 
China together with other nuclear states signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
 Safety of Kazakhstan is impossible without ensuring its territorial integrity 
and safety of its borders. In April, 1994 during the visit of Li Peng, the Chinese State 
Council Premier in Almaty the Kazakhstan-Chinese Border Agreement was signed. 
Kazakhstan became the first country among China`s neighbors with which China 
signed the document on passing of border. The Agreement established 70 key bor-
der points. 2 sites of the border were uncoordinated one of which is located in the 
Saur and Tarbagatay  Mountains, and the second is in the Ala Tau Mountains. It is 
also important to note that for the first time the Chinese party conducted boundary 
negotiations with other party on equal conditions [5].
 In September, 1995 during the state visit of N. A. Nazarbayev to China the 
following documents were signed: the Declaration on further development of friendly 
relationship between the RK and China, the Memorandum of Military Cooperation, 
and also the Agreement on Use of the Chinese port of Lianyungang for processing 
and transportation of the Kazakhstan freights. Thus, Kazakhstan had an additional 
opportunity of an entry into the world markets.
 In summer,1998 the parties signed a new the Border Passing Agreement. 
Kazakhstan agreed to compromise version of the section of a disputable site of the 
border. The site of the boundary territory challenged by China in Soviet period was a 
part of the Kazakh SSR, and Kazakhstan inherited it from the former USSR.
 Other problem in relationship between Kazakhstan and China is a problem 
of mutual use of water resources of the rivers originating in The Xinjiang region 
and flowing to Kazakhstan, and further to Russia. The planned construction of the 
channel Irtysh – Karamay had the purpose to provide with water resources the areas 
which were lack of water.  The part of the Irtysh upper source is thrown to the region 
of the Karamay oil field through this Channel.
 Expanded use of water resources of the Irtysh in the territory of China will 
break natural balance in the Zaisan Lake zone (in the delta of the Irtysh in the terri-
tory of Kazakhstan). The hard blow can be struck to economy of the East Kazakhstan 
and Pavlodar regions of Kazakhstan and the Omsk region (the Russian Federation). 
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According to the estimates of the Kazakhstan experts, natural concentration of 
harmful substances in the water can be increased  as a result of reduction of water in 
the Irtysh, and that will make it almost unsuitable for use in the economic purposes 
in lower reaches of the Irtysh.
 If the Chinese party uses over 10% of waters of the Irtysh, harmful conse-
quences of it will affect economic development of four areas of Kazakhstan. As well 
Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, will suffer and some other large cities of the Re-
public, as reserves of drinking water will sharply decrease. There will be prerequi-
sites for the outbreaks of epidemiological diseases among people and animals.
 The water drainage from other cross-border Ili river can also lead to similar 
consequences. This river provides Lake Balkhash with fresh water which plays an 
important role in the economy of the Republic. It provides the population of the 
Balkhash region and the enterprises of metallurgical and power branches with water. 
The extensive damage will be caused to agrarian sector, and the republic fishery, etc. 
[18] There is an unresolved problem of the following cross-border rivers – Irtysh, Ili 
and Tekes [6, page 78-100].
 The Kazakhstan authorities submitted this problem for discussion which is 
very important for three countries (Kazakhstan, China and Russia) and suggested to 
develop the agreement on interstate settlement of use of boundary water resources.
The following problem is the Uyghur separatism. Uyghurs live in The Xinjiang 
region, China (7,7 million people), in Kazakhstan (185,3 thousand people), in the 
Andizhan region of Uzbekistan (14 thousand people), in the Osh and Chu regions of 
Kyrgyzstan (11,2 thousand persons). Epicenter of separatist movements of Uyghurs 
is in The Xinjiang region of China; however, the sub - centers of separatism are in 
various areas of the Uyghur dispersion, including Kazakhstan.
 The Uyghur separatism in the Xinjiang region is connected with national 
policy of the Chinese authorities in the region. Mass resettlement of ethnic Chinese 
to this region causes discontent of the local Uyghur and Kazakh population. In total 
with policy of restriction of birth rate and infringement of the religious rights of 
Muslims, this factor stimulates separatist sentiments here. Mass actions of the Uy-
ghur population under separatist slogans took place here in April 1990, in February 
1992, in May 1996, in February 1997, in January 1998.
 The Pan-Turkism is most often the main unifying moment of the Uyghur 
separatism. It provides support of this movement from Kazakhs of the Xinjiang re-
gion, and also from outside the Uyghur of Kazakhstan and other republics of the 
region.
 The authorities of Kazakhstan are not interested in support of the Uyghur 
separatists, as they do not want to strain relations with China; besides the Uyghur 
separatism in Kazakhstan represents direct threat of territorial integrity and inter-
nal security of the republic. The government of Kazakhstan, trying to avoid strain 
of relations with China because of the Uyghur problem, refused registration of the 
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Uygur Organization of Freedom which proclaimed the purpose „to assist  restoration 
of Uyghurstan independence”. The refusal was motivated as the legal recognition of 
the party activity would contradict the obligations of Kazakhstan following from its 
membership in the UN [7].
 Since 1991 China has been the main trade partner of Kazakhstan out of the 
CIS. In December, 1991 the Chinese delegation headed by Li Lanking, the Minister of 
Trade and Foreign Economic Relations of China made tour around the countries of 
CAR for the purpose of studying of the arising Central Asian market. In September, 
1992 in in Urumqi Li Peng, the Premier of the State Council opened the first inter-
national trade fair which purpose was development of foreign trade of the Xinjiang 
region with the countries of CAR. China assumed function of mitigation of acute 
commodity shortage which arose in Kazakhstan in the early 90sof the XX century. In 
1992 the railway communication Alma-Ata – Urumqi was opened and Kazakhstan 
reconstructed the “Friendship” border station. Nearly one third of the Xinjiang re-
gion export and more than one third of its import was with Kazakhstan.
 In recent years Kazakhstan has been exporting coal, oil, aluminum, fer-
roalloys, copper, mineral fertilizers, nickel, etc. to China.
 Today the economy of China faces shortage of energy resources therefore 
Kazakhstan can become the main supplier of oil in the short term for it. The Chi-
nese National Oil Company (CNOC) acquired 60% of shares of „Aktobemunaygaz” 
company that develops the Aktyubinsk oil field, in September, 1997 China and Kaza-
khstan signed the Agreement on development of the Uzensk oil field. Kazakhstan is 
also interested in expansion of supply of oil to China as it promotes strengthening of 
its economic independence.
 The phenomenon of the Chinese migration in Kazakhstan appeared in the 
80-90th of the last century. In 2006 according to the data of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 3140 citizens of China lived in the RK. The Kazakhstan researcher K.L. Syr-
oyezhkin allocates the following reasons of the Chinese migration:
 First, it is employment of „excess labor” and existence of unoccupied niches 
in spheres of possible jobs of the Chinese migrants. As a consequence there is preva-
lence of the Chinese labor migrants in a service sector, wholesale trade, purchasing 
activity, etc. Secondly, there are more comfortable conditions of business and great 
opportunities for acquisition of „the starting capital”, in comparison with China.
 Thirdly, there is an opportunity of departure through the territory of Kaza-
khstan to the third countries.
 Fourthly, there is a version that the Chinese labor migration to Kazakhstan 
is urged to create conditions for implementation of the „transnational managing” 
doctrine when the Chinese diaspora in the form of the Chinese associations and busi-
ness is formed for economic and geopolitical expansion.
 At last, there is rather liberal mode of registration and control over activity 
of the enterprises which were created with participation of the foreign capital [8].
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 K.L. Syroyezhkin allocates 2 options of further evolution of the Chinese di-
aspora in Kazakhstan. In the first case there will be a gradual integration of Chinese 
in the Kazakhstan society that can become a stimulator of inflow of investments in 
the future and will give stability to the relations between the states. In the second 
case if the Chinese communities conduct „shadow activity”, Chinese will become the 
reason of interstate friction, and also an unpleasant consequence for the Kazakhs 
living in China.
 Value and involvement of China into the political processes happening in 
the region are possible to explain, first, with existence of the general and quite ex-
tended border (3700 km) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (that explains 
so-called „priority” of these states for foreign policy of China), secondly, existence of 
the quite sharply standing problem of terrorist character in the territory China (the 
Uyghur separatist movements to the Xinjiang region, separatists of Tibet) and, in the 
third, deep concern about the increasing activity in the region of the USA.
 The question of borders is almost resolved both within the SCO, and with-
in bilateral cooperation with the boundary republics. So, in 1994 Kazakhstan and 
China signed the Kazakhstan-Chinese Border Delimitation Agreement (extent of 
1 700 km); in 1998. The Kazakhstan-Chinese Border Additional Agreement divided 
disputable sites  by means of an exchange of territories; in 1999 the Contract on the 
Chinese-Kazakhstan border was signed. In July, 1996 the Kyrgyz-Chinese Border 
Agreement between the Kyrgyz Republic and China was signed(more than 1 000 
km).
 In August, 1999 the Kyrgyz-Chinese Border Additional Agreement was 
signed between the Kyrgyz Republic and China. In 1999 Agreements on points of 
a border joint of Kyrgyzstan with Kazakhstan and China were signed, and in 2000 
–with Tajikistan and China. The question of borders with Tajikistan is almost re-
solved. The fact, that the boundary problem of China with the Central Asian repub-
lics is almost resolved,  was positively reflected in development of a situation around 
the Xinjiang region [9].
 The Chinese government is against fight of powers and the different politi-
cal organizations in the CAR. China does not seek for expansion of the influence in 
the region, does not impose the will and views to the CAR countries, but at the same 
time does not allow any activity doing harm to the sovereignty of China; cooperation 
should be directed on strengthening of the world and development of all Asia [10].
Turkey. According to Z. Bzhezinsky, strategy and influence of such neighboring 
states as Turkey and Iran are the additional factor destabilizing the general situation 
as they have imperial, cultural, religious and economic interest in the region from 
the historical point of view. The role of Iran and Turkey in the region represents 
rivalry from the point of view of ideology, culture and economy.
 Turkey accented the ideological moments „in the spirit of a Pan - Turkism”, 
seeking to create an image of the representative of the West opposing penetration 
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into the region of fundamental Iran. The CAR states were attracted by the Turkish 
model of development combining secular character of a state system with moderate 
Islam. Already in the mid-nineties the Turkish capital investments in Turkmenistan 
reached 650 million dollars. Besides, Turkey takes the third place on the volume of 
investment in Kazakhstan after the USA and Great Britain. Turkey developed coop-
eration with the countries of CAR in cultural, information and educational areas. 
So, about ten thousand students from the countries of CAR studied at the Turkish 
universities.
 The construction project of the oil pipeline of Baku – Ceyhan for transporta-
tion of oil from the CAR across the territory of Azerbaijan and Georgia, passing Rus-
sia, would allow Turkey to receive 400 million dollars annually in the long term, and 
also promises transformation of the Iskenderun gulf in the large world oil center. 
However by the end of the 1990th Central Asian strategy of Turkey began to lose the 
efficiency.
 Turkey could not achieve a role of the leader in the region as the foreign 
policy of the Central Asian countries was characterized by a multi - vector and pres-
ervation of political, military and economic relations with Russia. In the late 90s of 
the XX century the term „Turkish model” disappeared from a lexicon of the Central 
Asian mass media. Following the results of the summit of the CAR heads in Ankara 
in 2001 Turkey needs to be guided by system of priorities of the Central Asian coun-
tries.
 Iran. The policy of Iran for the countries of CAR was defined by discrepancy 
of cultural and religious stereotypes. Iran sought to adjust regional cooperation with 
the CAR on a tripartite basis with participation of Russia, with the purpose not to 
allow „double” isolation – from the USA and from Turkey.
 Unlike Turkey, Iran placed the main emphasis on idea of dialogue of civiliza-
tions in a zone of contact of various cultures, religions. Iran considers that renewal of 
the relations with Islamic societies is natural continuation of historical and cultural 
ties of the people and civilizations. Without supporting the Islamic oppositional 
movements in the region, Iran tries to protect the personality and the rights of Mus-
lims in the interstate relations [11].
 Pragmatical interests are the cornerstone of the Iranian policy. For Iran the 
most perspective sphere of cooperation with the countries of CAR is production, 
processing and transportation of energy sources, and a main goal is access to new 
projects on development of gas and oil fields and a turn of an export stream of energy 
carriers from the CAR to Iran. As well delivery of energy sources from Iran to Russia 
and Europe is envisaged. In medium-term prospect Iran seeks to support own politi-
cal role in the CAR by means of investments expansion and seeks to create the „gas 
OPEC”in the CAR. On the other hand, from the point of view of the Iranian experts, 
the Central Asian direction seems as an additional incentive of modernization of the 
Iranian economy.
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 Iran attaches special significance to the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO). Iran makes a certain impact to the CAR by means of Shiite Pro-Iranian Group 
“Islamic Unity Party in Afghanistan” which tries to play a role the CAR.
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Streszczenie
 Artykuł poświęcony analizie geopolitycznych pozycji największych państw – graczy 
w Azji Centralnej – Chin, Iranu, Turcji.
Аннотация
 Статья посвящена анализу геополитических позиций в Центральной Азии 
крупных региональных государств - Ирана, Турции, Китая. 
Abstract
 The article is devoted to the analysis of geopolitical positions in Central Asia of large 
regional states - Iran, Turkey, China.
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